Copyright 1913, by FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY

CHAPTER 28

THE MORMON WAR

IT is necessary now to leave the regular course of events in Utah and bring together the threads from which were woven that web of shamed authority and lost opportunity known as the "Mormon war." This "war" was but one more clash between democracy and theocracy, between free government and despotism. The growing nation had come once more in contact with the Mormon kingdom, and as before, contact meant conflict. But this time, aggression as well as provocation was commenced by the kingdom; and the nation failed to use its overwhelming might to end in fitting fashion the quarrel which Brigham and his aids had begun.

The experience of judge Brocchus had been prophetic. He was but the first of a considerable line of retreating federal officials who proclaimed that there was no law in Utah save the will of Brigham Young. Steptoe was caught in an intrigue as cleverly managed as if Brigham had been trained at the court of Louis XV, instead of in the backwoods and prairies of America. Judge Drummond was balked and baffled when he undertook to resist some of the legal predilections of the territory. Judge Stiles was defied to his face, told that if he decided against the Mormon contention, he would be taken from the bench, "damned quick" -- and Brigham refused to give the court protection. David H. Burr, surveyor-general of Utah, made a report to the federal government, adverse to some claims of Brigham Young. A few days later, Burr was visited by three Mormon officials, the clerk of the supreme court, the territorial marshal, and the acting district attorney. They showed him a copy of his report, warned him that they would know every word he sent to Washington, and intimated that he would better cease criticizing the land titles of the "Lion of the Lord."

Insults like these could not be endured forever, even by the complaisant federal government of the decade prior to the Civil War. Matters were made more serious by the persistent efforts to get Utah admitted as a state. One such attempt was made in 1854, another in 1856; and though these efforts failed, they gave earnest of a settled purpose, most skilfully prosecuted. Even in our day, when the theory of absolute state sovereignty lies buried at Appomattox, Utah's stateship has enabled the Mormon hierarchy to violate its pledges with impunity, and to seat its ambassador in the senate of the United States. Fifty years ago, statehood was almost priceless. Federal control of territories was substantially as great then as now; while federal control of states had been lessening since the days of Jackson, till it well-nigh had reached the vanishing point. Sooner or later, a political bargain would give the Mormons this boon at the hands of Congress, as a political bargain had secured them the Nauvoo charter from the legislature of Illinois. With the slave state problem of the South complicated by a polygamy state problem in the West, the Union might become scarce worth preserving. Every patriotic statesman, whose attention was not monopolized by slavery, recognized with irritation and alarm the growing arrogance of the Mormon kingdom.

But as often happens in our country, the people were taking fire faster than their officials. All over the land was rising a slow but mighty tide of anger against the polygamous despotism of Brigham Young. It was an anger resting on instinct and suspicion, rather than on knowledge; but for the moment it was little less dangerous on that account. In June of 1856, the first Republican national convention classed polygamy with slavery as "twin relics of barbarism." In the same month, as if to warn the Mormons that they could not longer play off one party against the other, Stephen A. Douglas, leader of the Democratic party, made a speech at Springfield, Illinois. He recited the charges made against the Mormon kingdom, and declared that if those charges were proven true, it would be the duty of Congress to "apply the knife, and cut out this loathsome and disgusting ulcer."

As in most disputes, there is something to be said on both sides. The Mormon view was not entirely without merit. They misused and bullied federal officials; but many of those officials were of a breed to invite such treatment. Judge Drummond, for example, left his wife in the "States," to travel openly about Utah with his mistress; and he was in the habit of trying cases with her sitting beside him. There was also a healthy impatience with "carpet-bag government," which all Americans can understand and respect. But when all other allowances are made, the fact remains that then, as now, the Mormon kingdom was set in sullen opposition to every principle and practice of American government. The only question at any time was whether the nation would accept the provocation which the kingdom never ceased to offer.

Brigham's one declaration: "I am and will be governor, and no power can hinder it," was enough to justify his summary removal, and the use of any power or punishments necessary to make that removal effective.

Mormon writers have tried to find the cause of the "war" in the disappointment of a mail contractor, and the subtle scheming of Southern statesmen, who wished to disperse the regular army to make ready for secession. As for the last, it was hardly a powerful motive so early as 1857, and if it had been the determining factor of the "war," the number of troops first ordered to Utah would have been much larger than was the case. As for the mail contract, Heber C. Kimball did underbid W. M. F. Magraw, and Magraw did write to the president a letter denouncing the Mormons in severe though general terms. But Magraw did not write the first national Republican platform, nor make the Springfield speech of Stephen A. Douglas, nor seize the papers of a United States judge, nor open the mail of a surveyor-general, nor presume, to name the perpetual and irremovable governor of Utah, nor do any of the thousand things which made it clear that a clash between Mormonism and Americanism was inevitable.

May 28, 1857 -- less than three months after President Buchanan took office -- Winfield Scott, general-in-chief of the regular army, sent a circular to heads of departments, reminding them of the orders already issued to assemble troops at Fort Leavenworth for the Mormon expedition, and giving in some detail the equipment to be provided. The force was to consist of 2,500 men. In addition to ordinary supplies, 2,000 beef cattle were to be bought, and driven forward with the army. One month later, June 29, a letter of instructions, prepared after consultation with the War Department and doubtless with the President, was despatched to General W. S. Harney, then proposed for commander of the expedition. He was to accompany the new civil governor to Utah, and to use his force as a posse comitatus to enforce the orders of the governor, or the decrees of judges. He was to avoid all conflict with the inhabitants of Utah, so far as it was possible to do so; and particularly he was to attack no one, except in carrying out his orders from the civil authorities, or in sheer self-defence. At the same time, he was warned to expect armed and organized resistance on the very threshold of the rebellious territory and was counselled not to divide his forces. This letter contained some remarks about the trouble that might ensue, owing to the lateness of the start. This halting prophecy was fulfilled, as thoroughly as if it had been one of Heber Kimball's.

Most of the troops got away from Fort Leavenworth late in July. Partly by good luck -- which favored him throughout this episode -- arid partly through the shrewd intelligence and devotion of two of his subordinates, Brigham knew of the expedition almost as soon as it had started. Abraham O. Smoot, father of the present Apostle, Senator Reed Smoot, and at that time mayor of Salt Lake City, left that city June 5, 1857, with the monthly mail for the East. He met soldiers on the plains, who said they were scouting for Indians -- and Smoot had seen no Indians. Some distance west of Independence, the eastern end of his mail route, Smoot began to meet heavy freight team, whose drivers would say only that they had government freight, and were bound -- as was self-evident -- for some western post. Two days later, he reached Kansas City, where his suspicions were well confirmed, and he learned of the proposed "invasion."

The postmaster at Independence refused to deliver any more mail for Salt Lake City. Turning westward, Smoot and his associates began to gather up their horses and supplies which had been used in transporting the mails. They met "Port" Rockwell with the July mail, too miles east of Fort Laramie, and he turned back with them. On July 18, Smoot and Rockwell left Fort Laramie with four of their best horses, and a light spring wagon. Five days and three hours later, they drove into Salt Lake City, a distance of 513 miles.

The 24th of July is the day kept memorable by Mormons as the anniversary of their entrance to the Happy Valley. This being the tenth year since that event, unusual preparations were made for the celebration, which was to take place at Cottonwood Lake. According to most Mormon accounts, Brigham was already at the lake when Smoot and Rockwell arrived in the city on the evening of July 23, and they followed him thither next morning with the news. When the people gathered round him for the speech without which no great occasion was deemed complete, Brigham told them that a federal army was marching against Zion. He reminded them of his own declaration on entering the valley, that in ten years' time he would ask no odds of Uncle Sam or the devil; and added with whimsical humor that the devil had taken him at his word. He promised his people that if they would live their religion, God would see them through their trials, and strike down the legions coming against them.

Notwithstanding this reliance on the Lord, Brigham did not neglect his part of the prophesied deliverance. Messengers were sent to England, the Continent, and the Pacific states to call home the missionaries who were in those parts laboring for Zion. The Western Standard, a church paper published in San Francisco, was ordered discontinued, and its editor and his assistants returned home to defend the kingdom. A prosperous colony had been started in southern California, and this also was sacrificed. The abandonment of Nevada, then known as Carson county, was only in part the result of the approaching peril; but perhaps this was the deciding factor. No one hesitated, no one rebelled. With a courage worthy of greater enlightenment and a better cause, the Mormon people gathered around their prophet, prepared to do his will, even unto the uttermost, in resisting a nation amply capable of wiping them from the face of the earth.

Indeed, this was the fate which they believed had been prepared for them; and Brigham was not slow to encourage that notion. Even more than the British authorities whom Mulvaney describes, Americans on each new movement of troops act "like a girls' school meeting a big red bull in the road." Wild talk ran from tongue to ear in the eastern states and on the Pacific coast, that the troops had been sent to disperse the Mormon community and to hang Brigham Young. In spite of the absence of a mail service, these rumours quickly found their way to Utah, and they grew on the road. The experience of the Saints in Missouri and Illinois gave color to these tales of destruction, and the man whose cool judgment -- had he suffered it to prevail -- would have known at once the absurdity of the stories and the impossibility of resistance, was storming to and fro in the pulpit, increasing the excitement.

"We have borne enough of their oppression and abuse," urged Brigham, "and we will not bear any more of it . . . I am not going to permit troops here for the protection of the priests and the rabble in their efforts to drive us from the land we possess. You might as well tell me that you can make hell into a powder-house as to tell me that they intend to keep an army here and have peace. I have told you that if there is any man or woman who is not willing to destroy everything of their property which would be of use to an enemy if left, I would advise them to leave the territory. And I again say so today; for when the time comes to burn and lay waste our improvements, if any man undertakes to shield his he will be treated as a traitor, for judgment will be laid to the line and righteousness to the plummet. . . . Now, the faint-hearted can go in peace; but should that time come, they must not interfere. Before I will again suffer as I have in times gone by, there shall not be one building, nor one foot of lumber, nor a fence, nor a tree, nor a particle of grass or hay that will burn left within reach of enemies, I am sworn, if driven to extremity, to utterly lay waste this land, in the name of Israel's God, and our enemies shall find it as barren as when we came here."

Whether Brigham would have kept his oath if driven to extremity can be but a matter of opinion. The present writers believe he would. At any rate, he went on making plans for resistance. On August 1, the Nauvoo Legion was ordered to hold itself in readiness. On August 13, a party was sent out to reconnoitre, and get in touch with the advancing force. The last of the same month, Captain Van Vliet, of General Harney's staff, arrived in Salt Lake City as a sort of avant courier, to learn what disposition the church leaders really bore toward the federal government. He was not long in learning. Brigham received him courteously, but declared over and over that the approaching troops never should enter the valley. The Mormons had suffered enough, Brigham declared, arid henceforth they meant to meet persecution on the threshhold; and he dwelt at length on his determination to make the valley a desert before the federal troops should enter it. "If they [the government] dare to force the issue," declared Young, "I shall not hold the Indians by the wrist any longer for white men to shoot at. They shall go ahead and do as they please."

Two days before this remark was made, the Indians -- with the aid of some fifty-four Mormons -- had "done as they pleased" at Mountain Meadows. Brigham did not know this as yet; but his statement shows that he had considered using the Indians as allies against the United States. It speaks volumes for his personality that in spite of his utter repudiation of the nation which his visitor served, he sent Captain Van Vliet away more than half convinced of the justice of the Mormon cause.

Van Vliet left Salt Lake City September 14. The next day, Brigham issued a proclamation declaring martial law in the territory, and breathing forth threatenings on all enemies of the Saints.

"For the last twenty-five years we have trusted officials of this government, from constables and justices to judges, governors and presidents, only to be scorned, held in derision, insulted and betrayed. Our houses have been plundered, and then burned, our fields laid waste, our principal men butchered, while under the pledged faith of the government for their safety, and our families driven from their homes to find that shelter in the barren wilderness and that protection among hostile savages, which were denied them in the boastful abodes of Christianity and civilization.

"We are condemned unheard, and forced to an issue with an armed mercenary mob, which has been sent against us at the instigation of anonymous letter writers, ashamed to father the base, slanderous falsehoods they have given to the public; of corrupt officials who have brought false accusations against us to screen themselves in their own infamy; and of hireling priests and howling editors who prostitute the truth for filthy lucre's sake."

It is needless at this day to do more than indicate the chief absurdities of this proclamation. It assumes two things: First, that the federal government had no right to send troops to a territory, arid second, that the mission of these troops was to destroy the Mormons, instead of to insure obedience to law. Both of these assumptions were false. Brigham's proclamations at this time, like his sermons during the "reformation," show how even a cool, calm judgment can be unsettled by the strong wine of irresponsible power.

But it was only in his rhetoric that this error of judgment was made manifest; and when we remember that his proclamations and letters were intended for the home market, which he understood better than anyone else, it may be there was no great blunder there. His preparations for the "war" and conduct of it were as perfect as possible in such a conflict. On September 22, a scouting party camped within half a mile of the slow-moving regular troops, and never lost touch with them till the beginning of winter. When the soldiers crossed the boundary of the territory of Utah, Brigham sent a letter to Colonel E. B. Alexander, commander of the advance guard. This letter informed the colonel that he had transgressed the orders of the august governor of Utah, who had forbidden armed troops to enter that sacred territory. The army must retreat immediately, declared Brigham; but if this should be impossible, owing to the lateness of the season, they might remain during the winter, provided they surrendered their arms to the Utah authorities! Instead of hanging the messenger who brought such an epistle, Colonel Alexander returned a courteous if somewhat curt rejoinder. With this exchange of missives, hostilities may be said to have begun.